Ernestine Meyer

A draft truce has been agreed to between Kiev and the Donbas — anyone think this one is going to last? I would think it depends greatly on whether the two sides can agree on what constitutes the new borders and thus how much territory Kiev will effectively cede.

For an interesting outlook on Putin’s plan for Ukraine and a controversial concept for thwarting it, see the latest issue of Foreign Policy at http://tinyurl.com/o4yqjo8.

For background on Anne Applebaum’s contention in The Washington Post that Putin might be willing to drop a nuke on Warsaw or Tallinn, see http://tinyurl.com/l69waxs.

Found an interesting, informative article in the current edition of Foreign Affairs on this subject. You can read it at: http://tinyurl.com/pmwn6zc

Based on the club’s discussion at out last meeting on Aug 25, a consensus was reached that we do not need to meet weekly and perhaps once a month would be adequate.

The OLLI Calendar lists the following meetings: Sep 15 at noon in TA-1, then at 9:30 on Sep 26, Oct 10, and Oct 24 in the Tallwood Annex. Those dates and times were negotiated to avoid conflicts with other OLLI activities, so I’ve decided to stick with that schedule.

If events warrant, I will call for an additional meeting when I can arrange a time and place with the staff and post the announcement on this blog.

Since our last meeting on Aug 25, NATO claims that Russian troops in large numbers have entered Ukraine headed toward Mariupol, the Ukrainian port on the Sea of Azov. Some analysts fear that this represents a third front aimed at shifting Ukrainian forces from the siege of Donetsk and Lugansk or even a direct thrust at opening a land corridor to Crimea.

Moscow admits that some Russian troops have taken leave from the Army and have volunteered to join the armed forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic to fight against the fascist hordes controlled by the illegal Kiev junta. Although they allegedly do not represent the Russian Ministry of Defense, it seems odd to me that they were allowed to bring their tanks and self-propelled artillery with them. The US Army has much stricter rules on the use of “service weapons.”

For a lengthy, but comprehensive assessment of Putin's motivation for his actions against Ukraine, see: http://tinyurl.com/nd7lq5b

Stratfor has published an interesting analysis of the predicament Putin faces. One option for him to avoid being ousted as president is to escalate the crisis in Ukraine by invading it. See “Can Putin Survive,” republished with permission of Stratfor, at http://tinyurl.com/l9onlua

 

Given the events in Ukraine and the continuing interest among the participants in the Club, we will meet again on Monday July 28 at noon.

Looks as if we will have a few things to talk about when we next meet on Monday 21 July at noon.

Here's a list of events since we last met:

6 Jul: Ukrainian forces retook Artemivsk and Druzhkivka. Several thousand attend pro-Russia rallied in Donetsk while Kiev announced blockade of both Donetsk and Luhansk.

12-14 July: Moscow claimed Ukraine fired artillery into Russia; Ukraine claimed AN-26 shot down by fighter jet or SAM. Neither was confirmed

14 Jul: US Dept of State issued Fact Sheet on Russian Intervention accusing Moscow of arming rebels. See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/229270.htm
16 Jul: US unilaterally increased sanctions against Russia, targeting two banks (Gazprombank and VEB), and two energy firms (Novatek and Rosneft). Move bars access to US debt markets for loans over 90 days. EU blocked loans for new projects in RU, but not for existing contracts.

17 July: Malaysian Airline shot down over eastern Ukraine with almost 300 aboard. Each side blames the other, but initial reports indicate it was hit by a medium-range SAM probably the SA-11 or SA-17, not usually found in local Ukrainian gun stores.